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On 25 February 2001, the Party of the Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) 
received 49.9% of the votes (50.7% after the recount) at the parliamentary elections. This 
gives it an absolute majority of 71 seats out of 101. The OSCE has characterised the 
elections as free and fair. The success of the PCRM can be explained by the worsening 
economic situation in the country, a result of unsuccessful reform efforts in the economy.  
 
During the election campaign the PCRM promised to achieve two major changes in 
Moldova if elected: to take the country into the Russia-B lar  Union and to give Russian 
the status of an official language. According to Mr Voronin, the leader of the PCRM, these 
questions will be decided through a special, nation-wide referendum.  
 
Since 1992, the Republic of Moldova has been closely monitored and assisted by the 
international community (the OSCE Mission was established in 1993), mainly because of its 
ethnopolitical conflict in the separatist region of Transdniestria. Following the armed 
conflict in 1992, political relations between the government of Moldova and the 
Transdniestrian authorities have remained deadlocked. Moldova wants to maintain the 
unitary state (“a common state”) in which Transdniestria would have a special status, while 
Transdniestria seeks recognition as an independent state. In 1994, a few years after ethnic 
tensions also escalated in the Southern part of the country, Moldova established “a national-
territorial autonomous unit” for the Gagauz, a Turkish-speaking minority. This solution has 
been hailed as a success, though the relations of the government of Moldova and Gagauzia 
have not been without difficulties since.  
 
Given these ethnopolitical tensions on the one hand, a d the pre-election promises of the 
PCRM on the other, one has to ask how these promises, if fulfilled, would influence the 
ethnopolitical situation in Moldova. Would they ease the existing tensions or would they 
create new ones?  
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Joining the Russia-Belarus Union  
 
Mr Voronin’s justification for joining the Union is that “it is abnormal [that], when the 
whole of Europe is uniting […] we, the former Soviet republics, are standing separately, 
awaiting donations from the West.”1 Indeed, not being fit to apply for EU membership 
because of its poor economic performance leaves Moldova with little choice. However, there 
are no firm guarantees that the majority of the population will vote for the union with 
Russia-Belarus at the referendum, even if Russia provides massive economic aid and, once 
again, restructures the Moldovan debts for natural gas and oil. At the same time, it is not 
certain at all that such assistance from Russia will easily materialise. Moreover, the 
mobilisation of ethnic Moldovans, who constitute more than 65% of the whole population, 
on ethnic and linguistic grounds for voting against the union at the referendum, cannot be 
excluded. Ethnic Moldovans have been contemplating the merger with the culturally 
identical Romania since 1991 and some 70,000 have already got Romanian citizenship. 
Therefore, the union with Russia and Belarus might be as unacceptable for them as the 
prospect of a union with Romania was to the Russian-speakers of Transdniestria.  
 
Transdniestria did not contribute to the victory of Mr Voronin’s party. Instead, it boycotted 
the parliamentary elections because the programmes of all competing parties supported 
Moldova's territorial integrity, and thus, from a Transdniestrian point of view, were evidently 
not supporting the Transdnie trian claim for independence. However, this does not mean that 
the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol should become worse. It has already been noted 
that the pro-Russian stance of the PCRM could help improve relations between Chisinau and 
authorities in the Transdniestrian region and thereby ease separatists’ concerns about 
possible discrimination against Russian-speakers.2 Indeed, the initiative of the PCRM may 
even please the leaders of Transdniestria, which have already attempted, though 
unsuccessfully, to join the Russia-Bel rus Union. Therefore, Transdniestria could very likely 
support the idea of joining Russia and Belarus. Whether it will trade its support to this idea 
for the recognition of its autonomy, or some other power-s a ing ar angement, remains to be 
seen.  
 
                                                  
1  See http://gazeta.ru/2001/03/03/n983628300.shtml  
2  Ron Synovitz, “Communist Party wins election”, RFE/RL Newsline, 26 February 2001, see at: 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/02/26022001115222.asp  
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As opposed to Transdniestria, the Gagauz participated in the last elections. The autonomous 
district of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri) gave the strongest support of all counties of Moldova to 
Mr Voronin’s party – 80.57% of the votes were cast for the communists.3 The reason may be 
the support which the communist faction of the previous parliament gave to Gagauzia in its 
disputes with the Moldovan government. Therefore, it looks fairly probable that Gagauzia 
will support the idea of joining the Union. It might be indicative of possible future actions 
that when Moldova was getting more independent from Moscow and introduced Moldovan 
(Romanian) as the state language in 1989, the Gagauz “reactive nationalists” wanted 
Gagauzia to stay in the Soviet Union as an autonomous republic. Currently, the Gagauz are 
promoting the idea of the federalisation of Moldova. After a recent visit to Moscow and 
referring to Russia’s support, Mr Mihail Kendighelean, chairman of the Popular Assembly 
of the Gagauzia, stressed that a federation between Moldova, Transdniestria, and Gagauzia is 
the only viable option.4 As Gagauzia has entered into various relations with the linguistically 
close Turkey, and as Bulgaria has supported the Bulgarian minority in southern Moldova 
politically, these countries may hold their own views on the possible fate of their ethnic 
brethren.  
 
However, last but not least, it is not clear how Russia might react to Moldova’s aspirations to 
enter the Union. The political elite of Russia might not feel comfortable about admitting an 
unreformed communist state. The economic elite of Russia might also be reluctant to use 
Russian resources to help Moldova out of its present economic misery. Such reluctance was 
already evident in the case of Belarus. On the other hand, in the context of NATO 
enlargement, Russia might be tempted to use Moldova as a military out-post n South-
eastern Europe. Again, in the case of Belarus, military considerations were not at the bottom 
of Russia’s priority list. Russia still has a military presence in the region, as 2000 of its 
troops are stationed in Transdniestria, not forgetting large amounts of military hardware, to 
be withdrawn in the near future according to the OSCE 1999 Summit in Istanbul.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
3  See the results of the elections at http://www.ifes.md   
4  See Natal’ia Prikhodko, “Gagauzia sotrudnichaet s PridnesNezavisimaia gazeta, 18 January 
2001, http://www.ng.ru/printed/cis/2001-01-18/5_gagauziya.html  
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Russian as an official language 
 
The plan to introduce Russian as the official language may please the leaders of 
Transdniestria and Gagauzia alike. Transdniestria has already established Russian as one of 
the official languages (the other two being Moldovan [Romanian] and Ukra nian). While no 
ethnic group constitutes an absolute majority in Transdniestria (in 1989, Moldovans made up 
40%, Ukrainians  28% and Russians 25% of the population), Russian is the dominant 
language. Thus, the Transdniestrian authorities can only welcome the stablishment of 
Russian as the second official language in Moldova. The Gagauz authorities could take the 
same positive attitude towards the referendum, as Russian is already one of the official 
languages of Gagauzia alongside with Gagauz and Moldovan (Romanian), and ethnic 
Gagauz know Russian much better than Moldovan (Romanian).  
 
Russia will most naturally welcome the upgrading of the status of Russian, as it recently did 
in the case of Kyrgyzstan. Again, although in practice Russian is used widely in different 
spheres of life in Moldova, including the civil service, giving it an official status might be 
problematic for ethnic Moldovans (65% of the population) for reasons of political and 
cultural symbolism.  
 
The PCRM has several options how to go about the referendums. It might be important to 
hold the referendum on Russian as an official language before the referendum on joining the 
Union, but it may appear better to hold them together. Moreover, one cannot exclude that the 
Russia-Belarus Union may consider the official status of Russian as a precondition for 
membership. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The plans of the communists of Moldova to take their country to the Russia-Belarus Union 
and to give Russian the status of an official language, if carried out, may contribute to the 
resolution of existing ethnopolitical conflicts in Moldova. However, the same plans might 
lead Moldova towards a federation, trigger ethnic mobilisation of the titular nation and create 
new dimensions of ethnopolitical tension in Moldova s ciety.  
 
 
